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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD S. BENNETT, WALLACE
F. BENNETT, and HAROLD H.
BENNETT, Trustees, dba THE
BENNETT ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
ARNEL K. DOWNARD,
Defendant and Respondent,

Case No.
13740

vs.
CLARIS E. JOHNSON and VELMA
JOHNSON and BOYD J. CLARK
and IRIS J. CLARK,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Arnel K. Downard is a defendant and respondent,
together with the defendants and appellants Johnson and
defendants and appellants Clark in an action brought
by the Bennett Association, hereinafter referred to as
"Bennett's", alleging that Downard had entered into a
contract with Bennett's for goods and services which
Bennett's provided. These goods and services included
the sale and installation of glass at a Taco Siesta building located in Weber County, Utah. Bennett's cause
of action against Downard is based upon the fact
1
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that Downard never made payment to Bennett's and
the cause of action against the defendants Johnson
and defendants Clark is based upon the fact that
as owners of the building, the defendants Clark and defendants Johnson, failed to exhibit a sufficient bond contrary to 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. The
defendant Downard cross-claimed against the co-defendants Johnson and Clark for the sum of any judgment
which might be rendered against him in favor of Bennett's alleging that the defendants Johnson and defendants Clark owed to Downard money due under a contract
they entered into for the construction of the building
in question.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Stated simply, Bennett's was granted judgment
against all the defendants in the District Court of Weber
County. The trial court granted Bennett's judgment
against Downard as a matter of law and thereafter based
upon special interrogatories the jury returned a verdict
indicating that Bennett's should have judgment against
defendants Johnson and Clark and further that defendant
Downard have judgment over against defendants Johnson and Clark for the amount Downard would have to
pay to Bennett's and an additional amount which was
owed to Downard by the defendants Johnson and Clark.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record on appeal consists of two volumes, one
of which consists of pleadings, minute entries and similar
papers. This respondent will refer to this volume by the
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designation " R " , and the other volume which is a trailscript of the testimony and proceedings held on May 1,
1974 will be designated by the letters " T r . "
The defendant and respondent Downard was a licensed general contractor doing business in the State of
Utah (Tr. 65). He sometimes conducted his business
under the name and style of Arnel K. Downard Construction Company but at no time was incorporated (Tr. 69).
During the year of 1968 he was contacted by Taco Siesta,
International, a California corporation, concerning the
construction of several fast food restaurants (Tr. 70,
71). I t was agreed upon with Taco Siesta that he would
construct restaurants at certain sites. One of these sites
was to be 3715 South Washington Boulevard, in South
Ogden, Utah. This site was owned by the defendants
Johnson and the defendants Clark (Tr. 38, 65).
Mr. Downard entered into an agreement with Taco
Siesta and the defendants Johnson and Clark which is
evidenced by defendants' Exhibit 1. This contract is dated
August 25, 1968 and provided that Mr. Downard would
construct the Taco Siesta facility and that the owners
would pay to Mr. Downard the sum of $31,860.00.
Prior to this the defendant Claris Johnson, on behalf
of himself and the defendants Velma Johnson, Boyd J.
Clark, and Iris J. Clark, entered into a contract with
Taco Siesta, the California corporation mentioned above,
whereby Taco Siesta would have its franchisee occupy
the building and pay rent to the Johnsons and Clarks (Tr.
53). Immediately after the contract of August 25, 1968
was entered into Mr. Downard undertook the construc-
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tion of the building located on the defendants Clarks'
and Johnsons'property.
Shortly thereafter Mr. Johnson advised Mr. Downard that he and the other defendants would need a bond
(Tr. 47). Pursuant to this request from Mr. Johnson,
Mr. Downard procured the bond (Tr. 57). This bond was
admitted into evidence as plaintiffs' Exhibit B.
Thereafter as construction of the building progressed, Mr. Downard approached Mr. Johnson on several
occasions with a list of the subcontractors and materialmen to whom money was owed as a result of the construction of the building (Tr. 66). On these occasions Mr.
Johnson, on behalf of himself and the other defendants,
would draw upon a construction account at First Security Bank in Salt Lake City, Utah, which was opened
for the express purpose of paying for the construction of
the building (Tr. 45). Mr. Johnson would draw upon this
account and pay Mr. Downard directly (Tr. 44, 45). On
some occasions the checks or drafts were made payable
not only to Mr. Downard but subcontractors and materialmen as well (Tr. 44, 66). At about the time the building was completed, Mr. Downard approached Mr. Johnson and asked for additional funds to pay Bennett's and
other subcontractors, but Mr. Johnson advised him that
there were no additional funds (Tr. 20, 79, 80). Mr. Johnson explained that since rent was owed to defendants
Johnson and Clark by Taco Siesta, Johnson, on behalf
of himself and the other defendants, he deducted these
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payments from the construction account. At this point
in time not all the materialmen and subcontractors had
been paid, nor had Mr. Downard been paid for his services. The total amount which had been paid to that point
totaled the sum of $29,189.81. One of the subcontractors
who had not been paid was Bennett's to whom was owed
the sum of $2,029.00.
After Downard made demand upon the defendant
Johnson and the other defendants Johnson gave to Mr.
Downard his personal check in the approximate sum of
$379.00 (Tr. 15, 24). This check is dated May 17, 1969
and drawn upon Mr. Johnson's personal account. It is
defendant's Exhibit 3.
This left a balance owing to Bennett's in the sum of
$1,652.00 and that although demand by Bennett's was
made upon Mr. Downard and the other defendants, no
payment was made. Downard explained to Bennett's that
he had no funds with which to pay them as an excuse
for not making payment. He further explained that the
reason he had no funds was that Mr. Johnson refused to
make further payment under the construction contract.
Thereafter Bennett's instituted the lawsuit against
all of the defendants, including Downard. While the lawsuit was in progress, the defendants Johnson and Clark
sold the building for $56,500.00 (Tr. 60, 61). The interim
between the time the building was completed nntil the
time it was sold it was also rented and the tenants paid
approximately $1,150.00 in rent (Tr. 62, 63).
5
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Bennett's made demand upon the defendants Johnson and Clark to produce the bond, but the bond was
never provided for inspection (Tr. 83, 84). It was the
contention of Bennett's that they should have judgment
against Downard based upon his failure to pay for the
goods and services provided and further that Bennett's
should have judgment against defendants Johnson and
Clark on the basis that they never exhibited the bond as
provided for in 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A., 1953 as amended. It was the position of Downard on his cross-claim
that although the defendants Johnson and Clark claimed
they were not parties to the contract (Defendants' Exhibit 1), that in the alternative defendants Johnson and
Clark would be estopped in denying that they were not
parties to the contract since they had made the contract
their own by their actions or that there was an implied
contract between Downard and the defendants Johnson
and Clark whereby it was agreed that they would pay
the sum of $31,860.00 to Mr. Downard for his services
and also to pay for the construction of the building.
Upon these facts Judge Wahlquist ruled as a matter
of law that the plaintiff Bennett's was entitled to a judgment against the defendant Downard. On these same
facts the jury returned and answered the interrogatories
indicating that Johnson and the other defendants were
parties to the construction contract marked Defendants'
Exhibit 1. The jury also returned and answered interrogatories indicating that the plaintiff Bennett should have
judgment against the defendants Johnson and Clark
based upon their failure to exhibit the bond as required by
law. Defendant Downard will only address himself to
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points 2, 3, 4 and 5 as set out in appellants' brief since
point 1 is an issue involving the plaintiff and defendants
Johnson and Clark only.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO GRANT DEFENDANTS JOHNSONS'
AND CLARKS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
DOWNARD'S CROSS-CLAIM.
It is the position of defendant Downard that although there was no express contract between the defendants Johnson and Clark and Downard for the construction of the building, there was an implied contract
which existed between these parties by virtue of Johnsons' relations with Downard. Downard also contends
that Johnson, on behalf of himself and the other defendants, adopted the construction contract as his own, as
well.
One of the cases cited by the appellant is McCaffery
v. Cronin, 140 C.A.2d 528, 295 P.2d 587 (1956). The Johnsons and Clarks contend that an implied contract is one
not expressed by the parties thereto but gathered from
facts showing their mutual intent to contract. Respondent
Downard would agree with this, but believes a closer
reading of the case supports his position rather than
the position of the Johnsons and the Clarks.
The McCaffery case is a case wherein McCaffery
sought to have the court declare exactly what his rights
and interests in certain insurance commissions were. The

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

trial court ruled that there was no agreement and that,
therefore, Cronin was not obligated to pay McCaffery
any portion of the commissions paid to Cronin. The California Court of Appeals in the Third District reversed
this decision, however, and stated, after referring to the
efforts made and work performed by McCaffery that:
It is said that an implied contract is one not expressed by the parties but gathered from the facts
showing a mutual intent to contract. Travelers
Fire Insurance Company v. Brock and Companif,
47 Cal. App. 2d 387, 118 P.2d 25. Where a party
has conferred upon another with the assent of
the latter a benefit which was not intended as a
gratuity the law implies a promise on the part of
the party receiving the benefits to pay the reasonable value. The principle was thus stated in
DeRosier v. Vierr, 109 Cal. App.2d 291, 294, 240
P.2d 660, 662; "When services are rendered by
one person from which another derives a benefit,
although there is no express contract or agreement to pay for the services, there is a presumption of law which arises from the proof of services
rendered that the person enjoying the benefit of
the same is bound to pay what they are reasonably worth." The doctrine of implied contracts
has its foundation in the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Anderson v. Doolittle, 97 Cal. App.2d 836,
218 P.2d 848. 295 P.2d at 591.
The Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court and
ruled that there was an implied contract existing between
the plaintiff and the defendant and that the plaintiff was
entitled to a judgment on that basis.
The Johnsons and Clarks further cite Corpus Juris
Secondum, Vol. 17, Contracts, §4. The reading of this
citation indicates that certainly the intent to contract
8
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is necessary, but there are other elements involved here.
I t is stated in Corpus Juris Secondum t h a t :
A contract implied in fact is one not expressed by
the parties but implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. I t
does not arise contrary to law or the express
declaration of the parties. Contracts implied in
law or quasi or constructive contracts are distinguishable in that such contracts do not rest on
assent of the parties but may exist regardless of
assent, 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §4, p. 557.
I t is further stated:
If a person who is a stranger to a contract deliberately enters into relations with one of the
parties which are consistent only with an adoption of such contract and so acts as to lead such
party to believe that he has made the contract his
own, he will not be permitted afterward to repudiate it. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §4, p. 562.
The Supreme Court of this state has adopted a
similar approach in regard to implied contracts. I n the
case of Wooldridge v. Wareing, 120 Utah 514, 236 P.2d
341 (1951), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the
existence of implied contracts.
In that case the plaintiff filed his action against the
defendant on two counts, the first being breach of contract and the second one of quantum meruit for services
rendered to the defendant. The plaintiff and defendant
worked together as sales representatives, and they contacted numerous prospects together in an effort to sell
insurance plans. The evidence was that the plaintiff
9
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assisted the defendant in making the sales and that they
jointly worked together traveling extensively in an effort
to make sales.
The trial court found that there was no express contract between the parties, although the plaintiff had requested a written statement from the defendant as to
the commissions he would earn. He received a response
from the defendant that he would be fair and square with
the plaintiff. The Utah Supreme Court in upholding the
decision of the trial court stated:
Here, be it remembered, the court found there was
no express contract, to which finding both parties
subscribed. Hence, plaintiff's recovery must be
had not by way of express agreement of the
parties but by way of a contract implied in fact,
v
based on the principle that the law will impose an
obligation to pay reasonable compensation where
one has accepted the unof ficious services of another
not gratituitously but under circumstances that
would make it unfair not to pay. It is one thing to
deny recovery on a contract where the terms
thereof are so indefinite as to lack a manifestation
of mutual assent. Also, it is one thing to restrict
recovery on a contract to an amount which by its
terms is to be determined by him who is to pay,
good faith being assured. But it would be an entirely different thing to deny recovery where lacking an expressed agreement, one party renders
valuable service to another in an unofficious manner, the latter accepting the fruits thereof. In such
event, the law, being reasonable, involves reason
in solving the problem,, and requires that he who
accepts service from him who unofficiously performs under circumstances justifying the latter
in reasonably assuming he would be compensated
must pay the reasonable value thereof. 120 Utah
at 517, 236 P.2d at 342.
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The appellant cites Baugh v. Barley, 112 Utah 1,
184 P.2d 335 (1947). This case is not applicable here
since the contract in question involved an oral promise
whereby the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff a
certain parcel of land. The plaintiff paid the sum of
$500.00 by way of check. The defendant endorsed the
check and negotiated it, but thereafter plaintiff entered
into a contract to sell the same tract of land to another
party at a profit. The defendant hearing of this sold the
land directly to the third party. The original down payment which was $500.00 was returned by the defendant
to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant for the sum of $525.00 which was the
amount the defendant profited from the sale. This would
also be the amount that the plaintiff would have profited
had he sold the property himself to the third party who
was the ultimate buyer.
The Utah Supreme Court held that there was no unjust enrichment because the work done by the plaintiff
in securing the new buyer was work done for his own
benefit. The court stated that the benefit conferred upon
the defendant was an incident of plaintiff's efforts to enrich himself. The court stated:
Generally unless such services enhance or benefit
the property of the defendant or otherwise confer
on him a direct benefit, they do not form the basis
for a contract imposed by law because there is no
unjust enrichment as that term is used in law.
Where such services operate to confer a direct
benefit upon the defendant, they may be recoverable. 112 Utah at 7.
11
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In another case, McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311,
241 P.2d 468 (1952), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that
in an action to recover under an implied contract for services rendered the plaintiff was entitled to recover under
the circumstances. The plaintiff brought his action on
the basis of quantum meruit for services rendered and
travel expenses incurred in securing buyers and bidders
for certain machinery which was sold for the defendant's
benefit, McCollum obtained access to the premises where
certain machinery was kept. The plaintiff, McCollum,
showed the equipment to several prospects and made
trips to Salt Lake City and Pocatello in response to defendant's request in an effort to sell the equipment.
The Utah Supreme Court held that there was an implied contract and stated as follows:
It is, therefore, essential that the court should
exercise caution in imposing the obligations of
implied contract, as contrasted to express contract,
where the parties have actually defined and agreed
to the terms they are found by. With such caution in mind, the test for the court to apply was:
Under all the evidence were the circumstances
such that the plaintiff could reasonably assume
he was to be paid and that the defendant should
have reasonably expected to pay for such services.
Here the fact that the plaintiff had been working
previously for the trustee in a similar capacity,
for which he had been paid, coupled with the request made by the defendant's attorney and agent
to continue the work, and the knowledge of the
defendant himself that the work was being done,
are all factors which the trial judge could take
into consideration in applying the above rule. We
conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support
12
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these findings of the court that there was an implied contract to pay for the reasonable value of
the plaintiff's services. 121 Utah at 315,
It is apparent that the courts have held that once
one party unofficiously renders services and the other
party accepts those services under circumstances justifying the party rendering the services to believe that he
would be compensated, then the person receiving the
benefit of those services must pay the reasonable value
thereof. It is apparent from the record that Mr. Downard who rendered services could believe that he was going
to be paid by the Johnsons and the Clarks for his services
he had performed in the same manner in building two
other restaurants in Salt Lake all the while believing he
had a contract with the owner of the building and the
property (Tr. 70, 75). The construction contract, defendants ' Exhibit 1, refers to Johnson as the owner and
the person with whom Downard was contracting. In addition, Downard would present certain bills, or at least a
list of bills, for payment and Johnson would pay Downard in order that Downard could pay the subcontractors
and materialmen. Towards the end of the contract when
the money in the construction account at First Security
State Bank was depleted, Johnson paid out of his own
account the sum of $379.00 (Defendants' Exhibit 3). In
addition, it was Johnson and not Taco Siesta who instructed Downard to obtain a performance bond, which
Downard did (Tr. 78).
As to whether or not Downard could reasonably believe that he had a contract with the owner, not only was
Downard operating under this belief, but Mr. Winters,
13
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the credit manager for Bennett's, held the same belief
(Tr. 29). The Johnsons and the Clarks now argue that
they had their contract with Taco Siesta and not Downard,
but when Winters, the credit man for Bennett's, approached Johnson for the money owed or in the alternative, the
presentation of the bond, Johnson never told Winters that
he had no responsibility for payment of the materialmen
or subcontractors or that Winters should seek payment
from Taco Siesta. At no time prior to the institution of
the lawsuit did Johnson indicate that he was not making
the contract his own. At no time prior to the institution
of the lawsuit did he claim that he was not a party to the
contract.
The question as to whether or not an implied contract existed between Downard and defendants Johnson
and Clark was ultimately a question of fact to be decided
by the jury, and the court did not err in failing to grant
the motion of Johnson and Clark to dismiss defendant
Downard's cross-claim.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING
INSTRUCTION NO. 2.
After setting forth the second interrogatory and
stating that the contract (Defendant's Exhibit 1) did not
give Taco Siesa authority to contract on behalf of Johnson and Clark the interrogatories state as follows:
. . . However, you are instructed that Johnson
will not be permitted to deny that he is a party
to the contract, if he knew that such a contract had
been executed and knew that an innocent person
14
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was relying thereon; and he did not inform such
person, that he was not a party to the contract,
and deliberately lay back and secretly let others
complete the project believing he was a party to
the contract.
However, Johnson would not be estopped to deny
that he is a party to the contract if Downard knew
that Wilkins had no authority to act for Johnsons
or the Clarks or knew that the only party that he
was contracting with was Taco Siesta.
The payment of debts to Taco Siesta by Johnson
would not be sufficient unless it was done in a
fashion that it reasonably misled Downard into believing that Johnson was the contracting party.
These instructions follow substantially the statement of
law given in 17 Corpus Juris Secondum, §4, Contracts. It
is stated in 17 Corpus Juris Secondum, §4, p. 564:
Thus, where one at the request of the owner performs work and labor in constructing or repairing,
without an express agreement for compensation,
the law implies a promise on the part of the
owner to make a reasonable compensation therefor, and it has been held that where one stands by
in silence and sees work done in the improvement of his premises, of which he accepts the
benefit, a promise to pay therefor may be implied.
17 O.J.S., p. 564.
The statement in Corpus Juris Secondum and the case
law cited above are in agreement with the instruction
given by the court. The Johnsons and the Clarks knew
that an innocent person, Mr. Downard, was performing
this contract, and yet they did nothing to advise him that
they were not a party to the contract or that they had
no contract with him. Downard unofficiously performed
15
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services which conferred a benefit upon the defendants
Johnson and Clark, and he could have reasonably believed under the circumstances that he had a contract
with the Johnsons and Clarks.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.
The appellants claim that the evidence adduced at
the trial is insufficient to sustain the jury's answers,
particularly the jury's answer to Interrogatory No. 2
which relates to this defendant and respondent. In doing
this, the Johnsons and the Clarks rely upon defendants'
Exhibit 2 which is the contract between the Johnsons
and the Clarks and Taco Siesta. In addition, they rely
upon defendants' Exhibit 1 which is the contract known
as the standard form agreement between owner and contractor and the fact that neither the Johnsons nor the
Clarks signed this contract. The only other fact they rely
on is that Johnson claimed that the reason he made payments directly to Downard was to protect Downard.
In making this argument the Johnsons and the
Clarks fail to take into consideration all the other evidence adduced at the trial which supports the jury's verdict. This includes the fact that Johnson is the one who
told Downard to obtain the bond and at Johnson's request
Downard did obtain the bond. For this and other reasons
Downard felt that he had a contract with the Johnsons
and the Clarks. This was borne out by the bond in which
it is stated that there was a contract between Downard
and the Johnsons and the Clarks. Downard's belief was
16
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supported by the fact that Johnson made all of the payments to Downard directly out of his construction account
specifically set up to pay for the building. In addition,
after the funds in the construction account were depleted
as a result of the Johnsons and the Clarks making deductions for money owed to them by Taco Siesta, Johnson
made a payment directly to Downard out of his personal
account which is Defendants' Exhibit 3.
In addition, Downard testified that he built two other
buildings under the same set of circumstances in Salt
Lake City (Tr. 70, 75). Apparently payments were made
to him directly by the owner and he always felt that he
had a contract with the owner (Tr. 70, 75). Johnson's
conduct further indicated that he had a contract with
Downard since when approached by Mr. Winter, the
credit manager for Bennett's, Winter stated that Johnson never told him that if he wanted additional money,
he should go to Taco Siesta (Tr. 24, 25). This led Winter
also to believe that the contract was between Downard,
the contractor, and Johnson, who was the owner.
It has long been the rule that on appeal the review
of the evidence is to be made in a light most favorable to
the respondent, as stated in Price v. Price, 4 Utah 2d
153, 289 P.2d 1044 (1955):
Defendant recites facts testified to by him which
he apparently assumes the court was required to
consider as true, but it is obvious from the trial
court's conclusion that the latter did not believe
everything defendant said. Other evidence adduced, if believed, would support the award, and
under familiar principles we cannot disturb the
judgment in such event. 4 Utah 2d at 154.
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Another case holding that the evidence must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the respondent is
Staheli v. Grant, 2 Utah 2d 421, 276 P.2d 489 (1954). The
Utah Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial
court in granting a verdict for the plaintiff. In considering whether or not the evidence adduced at trial was
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the trial court, the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
From such facts we cannot say the evidence was
such as to require us to depart from our stated
principles that on conflicting matters the evidence
is to be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party for whom the judgment was entered and
when so viewed, if there is evidence supporting the
judgment, it will not be disturbed. 2 Utah 2d at
422.
The Utah Supreme Court has set a criterion to be
followed in reviewing the evidence adduced in considering
whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.
In the case of Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 4 Utah
2d 137, 289 P.2d 196 (1955), the defendant appealed the
verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Among other
errors the defendant claimed that the verdict which indicated that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent
was contrary to the evidence adduced at trial. The Supreme Court in refusing to overturn the verdict stated
as follows:
It would only be when such refusal did such violence to common sense as to convince the court
that that no trier of fact, acting fairly and reasonably, would refuse to make such finding, that
it would be reversed. 4 Utah 2d at 144.
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Another criterion to be used is set out in Weenig
Brothers v. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101, 262 P.2d 491 (1953).
This case arises out of an automobile accident, and the
appellant alleged that the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict. In upholding the decision of the
trial court the Supreme Court stated:
In order to upset the judgment and command one
in its favor, the first obstacle plaintiff must overcome is to demonstrate that the evidence shows
with such certainty that reasonable minds could
not differ thereon, but the defendant was guilty
of negligence which proximately caused the collision. In absence of such degree of proof we
could not direct that such finding be made and
reverse the decision of the lower court. The defendant, having prevailed on conflicting matters,
the evidences are viewed in the light most favorable to him. 1 Utah 2d at 102.
I n an older case, Glen v. Rich, 106 Utah 232, 142 P.2d
849 (1944) the appellant therein urged that the findings
of the trial court were contrary to the preponderance
of the evidence. The Utah Supreme Court in affirming
the lower court's decision stated:
No good purpose can be served by detailing the
evidence here. Suffice it to say that we have reviewed the record, and there is ample evidence
from which the trial court could have made these
findings. They are not against the preponderance of the evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal. 106 Utah at 240.
In summary, it cannot be said that when all of the
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the respondents, preponderates in favor of the defendants
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Johnson and the defendants Clark. It further cannot be
stated that when the evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to the respondents that the minds of reasonable
men would find that the evidence preponderates in favor
of the defendants Johnson and Clark who are now asking
this court to overturn a jury verdict.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INFORMING THE JURY THAT I F MR. JOHNSON
SUSTAINED ANY LOSS, THAT THE BONDING COMPANY WOULD PAY FOR SUCH
LOSS AND I F IT WAS ERROR, IT WAS
HARMLESS ERROR ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL COURT.
f

The appellants now claim error on the part of the
trial court by virtue of the court's informing the jury of
the terms of the bond which is plaintiffs' Exhibit B. The
appellants fail to recall that one of the issues to be determined by the trial court was the sufficiency of the
bond. Counsel for the respondent Bennett's claimed that
Bennett's was entitled to a verdict against the appellants
first on the ground that the bond was insufficient, and
secondly that the bond was never exhibited upon request.
The comments made by the trial court were no more
than the court explaining its ruling that the bond was
sufficient in all respects. The court was merely explaining to the jury why they would only be deciding the issue
as to whether or not the bond was exhibited since the
court ruled, as a matter of law, that the bond met the
requirements of 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A., 1953, as
amended.
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In addition, the bond itself had been admitted into
evidence as plaintiffs' Exhibit B. The bond did provide
that the principal, United States Fidelity and Guaranty,
would hold Johnson harmless. The bond stated:
Now, therefore, the condition of this obligation
is such, that if the said principal shall well and
truly perform and fulfill all and every the covenants, conditions, stipulations and agreements in
said contract mentioned to be performed and fulfilled and shall keep the said obligee harmless and
indemnified from and against all and every claim,
demand, judgment, lien, cost and fee of every description incurred in suits or otherwise against the
said obligee, growing out of or incurred in the
prosecution of said work according to the terms of
said contract, and shall repay to said obligee all
sums of money which the said obligee may pay
to other persons on account of work and labor
done or materials furnished on or for said contract, and if the said principal shall pay to the
said obligee all damages or forefeitures which may
be sustained by reason of the non-performance or
malperformance on the part of said principal of
any of the covenants, stipulations and agreements
of said contract, then this obligation shall be void;
otherwise the same shall remain in full force and
virtue.
It can be seen that the court was merely explaining to
the jury the terms of plaintiffs' Exhibit which was admitted into evidence, without objection by the appellants.
The appellants now claim that this led the jury to believe that Johnson would be entitled to be reimbursed
if a judgment was rendered against him. The appellants
overlook the second page of the bond wherein it is stated:
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The surety shall not be liable under this bond to
the obligees, or either of them, unless said obligees,
or either of them, shall make payments to the
principal strictly in accordance with the terms of
said contract as to payment and shall perform
all the other obligations to be performed under
said contract at the time and in the manner therein
set forth.
Under the terms of the bond Johnson would be entitled to be indemnified by United States Fidelity and
Guaranty for this judgment and, of course, the United
States Fidelity and Guaranty would have a cause of action
over against Downard under the terms of the bond. The
reason Johnson did not have a cause of action over
against the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company was that he failed to make payments by his own admission as required under the contract which was attached to and incorporated in the bond.
It must be presumed that the jury was aware of this.
If they were not aware of it, it was the attorney for the
appellants' duty to make them aware of it by asserting
this argument when summation was made to the jury.
I t is asserted now by this respondent, for the reasons set
forth above that it was not error for the court to explain
its ruling, and if it was error, it was merely harmless
error since the terms of the bond were already before
the jury.
A case involving a similar, not exactly the same fact
situation, is Hardman v. Thurnicm, 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d
215 (1951). In that case the appellant objected to the testimony of a witness, since the testimony was obviously
heresay. The court at the trial level allowed the testimony to come in. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that this
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was not error stating that other competent evidence had
been admitted and that, therefore, the appellant could
show no prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
Complaint is made of the admission in evidence of
the testimony of the secretary of the corporation
for whom the decedent worked relative to discussions between the witness and the board of directors dealing with Hardman's efficiency and his
opportunities for advancement with the company.
Conceding that his testimony in this respect is
heresay, we think no prejudice resulted therefrom
since the secretary of the company under whose
immediate supervision Hardman worked testified
to his own knowledge of decedent's qualifications
and the likelihood of his advancement with the
company. 121 Utah at 150.
The appellant now takes the position that quite
possibly the jury felt that a verdict against Johnson was
a verdict against the "deep pockets" of United States
Fidelity and Guaranty. To do this we must assume that
the jury disregarded its instructions, disregarded the
exhibits, and the oath it took at trial. On the other hand,
it could very well be that the jury listened to its instructions, honored the oath it took and reviewed the evidence
recalling argument of counsel and, of course, the respondents are entitled to the presumption that this is, in fact,
what occurred. It could be that the jury realized that the
Johnsons and he d a r k s received a building reasonably
worth the sum of $31,860.00 yet only paid the sum of
$29,189.81 for it.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing all of the points asserted by both the
appellants and the respondents it is obvious that this case
was properly submitted to the court as a question of
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fact. The trial court did rule on one issue as a matter
of law and this is the issue concerning the sufficiency of
the bond. The trial judge felt that at the conclusion of
the case this was a case to be decided by the jury and
stated this once again when the appellants' motion for a
new trial was denied.
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the
law concerning implied contracts and when the jury,
having been instructed properly as to the law and considering all the evidence, returned the verdict in favor
of the respondent. To overturn this verdict would be to
deny the respondents a right to a trial by jury. It would
be a holding that all of the evidence adduced on behalf
of the respondents would be disbelieved with all of the
evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant be given
greater weight.
The appellant further claims that the jury would be
misled by the statement of the trial judge. The attorney
for the appellants failed to realize that the jury had had
all of the exhibits before it from which to make a decision.
Respondents being entitled to a presumption that the
jury acted correctly in all respects submits that this verdict should not be overturned and the verdict of the trial
court affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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PHILIP R. FISHLER of
STRONG & HANNI
604 Boston Building
Sail;Lake City, Utah
I ,
Attorneys for Defendant
amd Respondent Downard
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